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UNLIMITED DATA?:   
PLACING LIMITS ON SEARCHING CELL PHONE 
DATA INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST 
Thomas Rosso* 
 
The “search incident to arrest exception” is one of several exceptions to 
the general requirement that police must obtain a warrant supported by 
probable cause before conducting a search.  Under the exception, an officer 
may lawfully search an arrestee’s person and the area within the arrestee’s 
immediate control without a warrant or probable cause, so long as the 
search is conducted contemporaneously with the lawful arrest.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has justified the exception based on the need for officers to 
discover and remove any weapons or destructible evidence that may be 
within the arrestee’s reach.  Additionally, the Court has held that, under the 
exception, police may search any containers found on the arrestee’s person 
without examining the likelihood of uncovering weapons or evidence 
related to the arrestee’s offense.  In light of these principles, should the 
exception permit officers to search the data of a cell phone found on an 
arrestee’s person? 
In January 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review two 
appellate rulings and resolve a split among the circuits and state courts on 
this question.  This Note examines three approaches courts have taken to 
resolve the issue:  a broad approach, a middle approach, and a narrow 
approach.  This Note argues that the Supreme Court should adopt the 
narrow approach and prohibit warrantless searches of cell phone data 
under the exception. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine Willie Robinson is driving through a residential neighborhood in 
Washington, D.C.1  A police officer in the neighborhood has reason to 
believe that Mr. Robinson is driving on a revoked license, which is an 
arrestable offense in the District of Columbia.  The officer pulls Mr. 
Robinson over and, after confirming that he does not have a valid driver’s 
license, places him under arrest.  In accordance with local police 
procedures, the officer begins to search Mr. Robinson.  During the search, 
the officer feels a rectangular item in Mr. Robinson’s front shirt pocket.  He 
removes it and sees that it is an iPhone.  After handcuffing Mr. Robinson, 
the officer unlocks the phone and begins to scroll through Mr. Robinson’s 
recent messages.  After reading through several of Mr. Robinson’s emails 
and text messages, he finds a text message from a known drug dealer using 
a slang term for heroin.  This text message is later used as evidence against 
Mr. Robinson in a conviction for conspiracy to distribute heroin. 
This hypothetical is adapted from a U.S. Supreme Court case decided in 
1973,2 which was obviously long before individuals carried sophisticated 
electronic devices such as iPhones.  In that case, the item that the officer 
found in Mr. Robinson’s pocket was a cigarette pack rather than an iPhone.3  
The officer opened the pack and inside found several heroin capsules.4  The 
Supreme Court held that the search was lawful under the “search incident to 
arrest exception,” which is one of several exceptions to the general 
requirement that a search may only be conducted pursuant to a warrant 
supported by probable cause.5 
Under the exception, police may lawfully search an arrestee’s person and 
the area within the arrestee’s immediate control without a warrant or 
probable cause for the search, so long as the search is conducted 
contemporaneously with the lawful arrest.6  The exception has been 
justified by the need for officers to search for and remove any weapons or 
destructible evidence that may be within the defendant’s reach.7  United 
States v. Robinson established that a lawful arrest authorizes police officers 
to conduct this type of warrantless search without examining in each case 
the likelihood of uncovering weapons or evidence related to the crime of 
arrest.8  The case also established that police may search the contents of any 
“containers” found on the arrestee’s person during such a search.9  As noted 
above, in Robinson, the “container” was a cigarette pack,10 but courts 
 
 1. See generally United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (discussing an 
analogous factual scenario). 
 2. See id. at 218. 
 3. Id. at 223. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1967). 
 6. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235–36; see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 
(1969) (establishing the scope of the search incident to arrest exception). 
 7. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63. 
 8. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
 9. Id. at 236. 
 10. Id. at 223. 
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following Robinson have also held that searches of wallets11 and address 
books12 are lawful under the search incident to arrest exception. 
Courts have struggled to determine whether the Robinson rule allows 
police officers to search data on a cell phone found on an arrestee’s person 
during a search incident to an arrest.13  Some have held that a cell phone is 
essentially a “container” of information and may be lawfully searched just 
like a cigarette pack, wallet, or address book.14  These courts have stated 
that the heightened privacy interest an arrestee may have in his cell phone 
should not control the lawfulness of a search of its contents.15  Moreover, 
courts have reasoned that the interest in establishing bright-line rules to 
guide on-the-spot police judgments supports applying Robinson to cell 
phone searches.16  Otherwise, both police officers and courts would 
arguably face difficult line-drawing problems, requiring post hoc 
determinations, which the Supreme Court has sought to avoid.17 
However, other courts have held that a cell phone is distinguishable from 
a physical container, and therefore the generalization created by the 
Robinson rule should not govern cell phone searches.18  These courts have 
noted that information stored on cell phones is, “by and large, of a highly 
personal nature,” including “photographs, videos, written and audio 
messages (text, email, and voicemail), contacts, calendar appointments, web 
search and browsing history, purchases, and financial and medical 
records.”19  Moreover, a modern cell phone may carry the equivalent of 
millions of pages of text.20  Therefore, it is argued that a modern cell phone 
contains the volume and substance of information that “one would 
 
 11. See infra note 100. 
 12. See infra note 101. 
 13. See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S.Ct. 
999 (2014) (“Courts have struggled to apply the Supreme Court’s search-incident-to-arrest 
jurisprudence to the search of data on a cell phone seized from the person.”). 
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007); People v. 
Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 509 (Cal. 2011); Hawkins v. State, 723 S.E.2d 924, 926 (Ga. 2012). 
 15. See Diaz, 244 P.3d at 508 (“‘[T]he lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement 
of any privacy interest the arrestee may have’ in property immediately associated with his or 
her person at the time of arrest, even if there is no reason to believe the property contains 
weapons or evidence.” (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981))); Hawkins, 
723 S.E.2d at 926 (“[T]he mere fact that there is a potentially high volume of information 
stored in the cell phone should not control the question of whether that electronic container 
may be searched.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Diaz, 244 P.3d at 508. 
 17. See id. at 508–09 (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623 (2004)). 
 18. See, e.g., Wurie, 728 F.3d at 8–9; State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ohio 2009). 
 19. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 8; see also Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 732 (Fla. 2013) 
(distinguishing Robinson based on the “very personal and vast nature of the information” 
stored on modern cell phones); Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954 (“Even the more basic models of 
modern cell phones are capable of storing a wealth of digitized information wholly unlike 
any physical object found within a closed container.”). 
 20. See Wurie, 728 F.3d at 8 (citing Charles E. MacLean, But, Your Honor, a Cell Phone 
Is Not a Cigarette Pack:  An Immodest Call for a Return to the Chimel Justifications for Cell 
Phone Memory Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest, 6 FED. COURTS L. REV. 37, 42 (2012)) 
(noting that an Apple iPhone 5 model comes with sixty-four gigabytes of storage, which is 
enough to store 4 million pages of text). 
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previously have stored in one’s home and that would have been off-limits to 
officers performing a search incident to arrest.”21  This arguably establishes 
a heightened expectation of privacy in cell phones compared to other 
containers, warranting a different set of rules to govern cell phone 
searches.22 
Some courts have concluded that the rationales justifying the search 
incident to arrest exception simply do not apply to cell phone searches, and 
therefore the exception does not permit warrantless searches of cell phone 
data.23  These courts have reasoned that cell phones are not dangerous to 
arresting officers and that the risk of evidence being lost or destroyed is 
eliminated once the cell phone is seized from the arrestee.24 
Other courts have concluded that searching a cell phone incident to an 
arrest should be limited under the exception but not eliminated.25  These 
courts have held that searching a cell phone seized from an arrestee’s 
person should be permitted only when it is reasonable to believe that 
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found on the device.26  
Although this approach has not been applied above the trial-court level, 
several commentators have advocated for this approach.27  They argue that 
the approach is supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. 
Gant,28 which permits vehicle searches incident to an arrest where it is 
reasonable to believe evidence related to the crime of arrest might be found 
in the vehicle.29  However, in Gant, the Court explicitly limited its holding 
to the vehicle search context, so it is not clear that the Court would be 
willing to extend its decision to cell phone searches.30 
In January 2014, the Court granted certiorari to review two appellate 
rulings on this issue.31  The Court’s decision will have a substantial impact 
on privacy rights.  Law enforcement agencies executed an estimated 
12,196,959 arrests in 2012.32  Meanwhile, the rate of cell phone ownership 
 
 21. Id. at 8. 
 22. See id. at 8–9. 
 23. See infra Part II.C. 
 24. See infra Part II.C. 
 25. See infra Part II.B. 
 26. See infra Part II.B. 
 27. See infra Part II.B. 
 28. 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
 29. Id. at 343. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S.Ct. 999 
(2014); Riley v. California, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), 
cert. granted, 134 S.Ct. 999 (2014).  Oral argument is scheduled for April 29, 2014. See 
Supreme Court of the United States October Term 2013:  For the Session Beginning April 
21, 2014, SUPREME CT. U.S. (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_calendars/MonthlyArgumentCalApr2014.pdf. 
 32. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT:  
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/persons-arrested/arrestmain.pdf. 
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in the United States has grown substantially in recent years.33  As of May 
2013, 91 percent of surveyed American adults reported owning a cell 
phone, compared with 66 percent in January 2005.34  Additionally, a 
rapidly growing percentage of Americans own smartphones, which can 
carry far more information and have many more uses than traditional 
phones.35  Fifty-five percent of surveyed Americans reported that their cell 
phone is a smartphone in June 2013, up from 33 percent in May 2011.36  
This suggests that if police are automatically permitted to search the data of 
an arrestee’s cell phone incident to an arrest, several million such searches 
could occur yearly in the United States. 
Part I of this Note examines the history of the search incident to arrest 
exception, focusing particularly on the Supreme Court’s search for bright-
line rules regarding the scope of the exception.  Part II introduces three 
approaches to applying the doctrine to cell phone searches:  a broad 
approach, a middle approach, and a narrow approach.  Part III argues that 
courts should adopt the narrow approach and prohibit warrantless searches 
of cell phone data under the search incident to arrest exception. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION AND CURRENT STATE OF THE  
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures,” and states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”37  The Amendment was 
adopted largely in response to British abuses of the warrant system during 
the Colonial Era.38  The Supreme Court has held that, under the 
Amendment, warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable,” and are 
therefore prohibited, “subject only to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions.”39  Commentators have noted that, 
notwithstanding this assertion, the exceptions to the warrant requirement 
 
 33. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., SMARTPHONE OWNERSHIP—2013 UPDATE, at 8 (2013), 
available at http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2013/PIP_Smartphone_adoption_
2013_PDF.pdf. 
 34. Id. at 8–9. 
 35. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., CELL PHONE ACTIVITIES 2 (2012), available at 
http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_CellActivities_11.25.pdf.; PEW 
RESEARCH CTR., supra note 33, at 2.  
 36. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 33, at 2. 
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 38. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:  ITS HISTORY AND 
INTERPRETATION 23–40 (2008) (discussing how American colonial opposition to general 
warrants and writs of assistance spurred the adoption of search and seizure protections in 
state constitutions and, ultimately, contributed to the creation of Fourth Amendment); 
1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
§ 1.1(a), at 3–8 (5th ed. 2012). 
 39. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
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are in fact “neither few nor well-delineated.”40  Rather, the warrant 
“requirement” may be thought of as a strong preference, subject to many 
broad exceptions.41 
This Part discusses the establishment, refinement, and application of the 
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.  Part I.A 
discusses the development of the exception from its inception through 
Chimel v. California,42 which articulated the modern rationales for the 
exception.  Part I.B discusses the Supreme Court’s search for bright-line 
rules regarding the scope of the exception. 
A.  Origins of the Exception and the Pre-Chimel Era 
The Supreme Court first acknowledged the search incident to arrest 
exception in dictum of Weeks v. United States43 in 1914.  The Court noted 
the government’s right, “always recognized under English and American 
law,” and “uniformly maintained,” to “search the person of the accused 
when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of 
crime.”44 
Following Weeks, the Court vacillated between broad and narrow 
interpretations of the exception for over fifty years.45  Weeks acknowledged 
only the right to search an arrestee’s person.46  However, in 1927, the Court 
held that police could also search “the place” of arrest, which encompassed 
“all parts of the premises used for [an] unlawful purpose.”47  This broad 
rule, however, was short-lived.  In Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United 
States,48 the Court invalidated a search of an office in which the defendant 
was arrested.49  Similarly, in United States v. Lefkowitz,50 the Court held 
 
 40. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 
1473–74 (1985) (noting that there are over twenty exceptions to the warrant requirement); 
see also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 
770–71 (1994) (“[I]t makes no sense to say that all warrantless searches and seizures are per 
se unreasonable.”); Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement:  
Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 481 (1991) (asserting that the 
per se unreasonableness of warrantless searches should be replaced with a less rigid but more 
consistently enforced standard). 
 41. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 4.1(a), at 560. 
 42. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 43. 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (dictum). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755 (noting that the Supreme Court’s decisions on the issue 
“have been far from consistent, as even the most cursory review makes evident”); James J. 
Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing the Future of the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine:  
Avoiding Instability, Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1421–25. 
 46. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392. 
 47. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927). 
 48. 282 U.S. 344 (1931). 
 49. See id. at 349–50, 358.  The Court noted that in Marron, the officers had not 
conducted a “general search or rummaging of the place,” whereas in Go-Bart the officers 
“made a general and apparently unlimited search, ransacking the desk, safe, filing cases and 
other parts of the office.” Id. at 358.  Additionally, the Court recognized that in Marron, the 
arrestee was engaged in committing an offense at the time of his arrest and the seized items 
were plainly visible to the officers and were “in the offender’s immediate custody,” which 
was not the case in Go-Bart. Id. 
2450 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
that an “exploratory and general” evidence-gathering search of a single 
room was unlawful.51 
After approximately fifteen years of contraction,52 the Court again 
upheld a broader search in Harris v. United States,53 which involved the 
search of an arrestee’s four-room apartment following his arrest for fraud 
related to military draft cards.54  The Court held that searches incident to an 
arrest “may, under appropriate circumstances, extend beyond the person of 
the one arrested to include the premises under his immediate control.”55  
The Court concluded that the search was reasonable because it was 
“specifically directed to the means and instrumentalities of the charged 
crime,” which were likely to be concealed and could have been anywhere in 
the apartment.56 
The Supreme Court briefly retreated from Harris,57 but shortly thereafter 
upheld another broad, thorough search in United States v. Rabinowitz.58  
Over Justice Frankfurter’s forceful dissent,59 the Rabinowitz Court upheld a 
ninety-minute search of the office in which the defendant was arrested.60  
For nineteen years, Rabinowitz stood for the proposition that a “warrantless 
search ‘incident to a lawful arrest’ may generally extend to the area that is 
considered to be in the ‘possession’ or under the ‘control’ of the person 
arrested.”61  However, as one commentator has noted, a thorough analysis 
of the Court’s decisions during that period suggests a gradual erosion of this 
right, foreshadowing the Court’s overruling of Rabinowitz in Chimel.62 
In Chimel, officers arrested the defendant in his home for burglary of a 
coin shop.63  The officers then conducted a search of the defendant’s three-
bedroom home, including his attic, garage, and small workshop that lasted 
between forty-five minutes and an hour.64  The search uncovered several 
items tying the defendant to the burglary.65  Relying on Rabinowitz, the 
California trial and appellate courts held that the search was lawful.66  The 
 
 50. 285 U.S. 452 (1932). 
 51. Id. at 465–67. 
 52. See Tomkovicz, supra note 45, at 1424. 
 53. 331 U.S. 145 (1947), overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 54. See id. at 146–47, 155. 
 55. Id. at 151. 
 56. Id. at 152–53 (“[T]he area which reasonably may be subjected to search is not to be 
determined by the fortuitous circumstance that the arrest took place in the living room as 
contrasted to some other room of the apartment.”). 
 57. See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948) (holding that a search 
incident to arrest is a “strictly limited right” that must be justified by “something more in the 
way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest”), overruled by United States v. Rabinowitz, 
339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752. 
 58. 339 U.S. 56. 
 59. Id. at 68 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 60. See id. at 58–59, 66 (majority opinion). 
 61. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 760. 
 62. See Tomkovicz, supra note 45, at 1425–26. 
 63. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753. 
 64. Id. at 754. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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U.S. Supreme Court reversed, overruling Rabinowitz and holding that the 
search did not fall within the proper scope of the search incident to arrest 
exception.67 
The Court supported its departure from Rabinowitz’s broader holding on 
two grounds.  First, the Court held that Rabinowitz was “hardly founded on 
an unimpeachable line of authority,” noting that the Rabinowitz Court 
disregarded the narrower approaches taken in Go-Bart, Lefkowitz, and 
Trupiano v. United States and elevated mere dictum in Weeks far beyond its 
original authority.68  Second, the Court stated that broad authority to search 
an arrestee’s home following an arrest contradicted the “background and 
purpose” of the Fourth Amendment, which was adopted in response to 
extensive home searches conducted under general warrants during the 
colonial era.69 
The Court held that a search incident to arrest may only extend to the 
arrestee’s person and the area within the arrestee’s immediate control.70  
The Court described two rationales justifying a search limited to this 
scope.71  First, the Court held that it is reasonable for an officer to search 
the arrestee’s person and immediate surrounding area to remove weapons 
the arrestee might use to resist or escape the arrest.72  “Otherwise, the 
officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.”73  
Second, the Court held that it is reasonable to search the arrestee’s person 
and area within his immediate control to prevent the arrestee from 
destroying or concealing evidence.74  The Court concluded that a search 
beyond this scope would not be justified by the rationales for the 
exception.75 
B.  Searching for a Bright-Line Rule 
Although Chimel articulated the scope and rationales of the search 
incident to arrest exception, the Court did not address whether a search is 
lawful only when the rationales for the exception support a particular 
search, or whether instead the right to search follows automatically from the 
arrest without a case-by-case inquiry into the search’s justifications.  This 
section analyzes that issue in two parts.  First, it discusses whether a court 
must examine if a particular search could reasonably have uncovered a 
weapon or evidence related to the crime of arrest.  Next, it examines 
whether a court must assess the arrestee’s ability to have gained access to 
the searched area. 
 
 67. Id. at 768. 
 68. Id. at 760. 
 69. Id. at 760–61. 
 70. Id. at 768. 
 71. Id. at 762–63. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 763. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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1.  The Court Rejects a Case-By-Case Inquiry into  
Whether a Search Could Reasonably Have Uncovered  
Weapons or Evidence Related to the Crime of Arrest 
After Chimel, lower courts were frequently forced to determine whether 
the right to search follows automatically from the arrest or must instead be 
supported by facts indicating some likelihood that either evidence or 
weapons will be found during the particular search.76  This issue arose most 
commonly “in the context of an arrest for a minor traffic violation or some 
other lesser offense for which there could be no evidence and which would 
not of itself suggest that the perpetrator would be armed.”77   
In Robinson, the Supreme Court resolved the issue by articulating a 
bright-line rule that a lawful arrest automatically provides the right to 
search the arrestee, including any containers78 found on his person, without 
considering the likelihood that weapons or evidence would be found during 
the particular search.79 
The defendant was pulled over and subsequently arrested for driving with 
a revoked license.80  During a search incident to the arrest, the arresting 
officer felt an item in the defendant’s shirt pocket.81  The officer removed 
the object, saw that it was a cigarette pack, opened the pack, and inside 
found several heroin capsules.82  The officer later testified that he did not 
have any particular purpose in mind when he searched the defendant.83 
The Supreme Court held that the permissible scope of the search was not 
affected by the seriousness of the initial offense or likelihood of discovering 
evidence related to that crime during the search.84  The Court articulated 
two reasons for this conclusion.  First, it rejected the assumption that 
individuals arrested for driving with a revoked license are less likely to 
possess dangerous weapons than individuals arrested for other crimes.85  
Second, the Court fundamentally disagreed with the lower court’s 
suggestion that it must be litigated in each case whether a search was 
necessary to preserve officer safety or prevent destruction of evidence 
 
 76. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 5.2, at 128. 
 77. Id. 
 78. The Supreme Court has defined the term container as “‘any object capable of 
holding another object,’” which means common “containers” such as a suitcase, backpack, 
or a purse qualify as containers, but less obvious items, such as a jacket pocket or a car, are 
also “containers.”  See Cynthia Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops:  What the 
Disappearing Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1414 (2010) (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 
(1981)). 
 79. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
 80. Id. at 220. 
 81. Id. at 222–23. 
 82. Id. at 223. 
 83. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev’d, 414 U.S. 
218.  The officer also testified:  “I just searched him.  I didn’t think about what I was looking 
for.  I just searched him.” Id. 
 84. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234–35. 
 85. Id. at 234. 
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related to the crime of arrest.86  The Court held that while the search 
incident to arrest exception is justified by “the need to disarm and to 
discover evidence,” the authority to search “does not depend on what a 
court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that 
weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the 
suspect.”87 
The Court reasoned that an “officer’s determination as to how and where 
to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a 
quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be 
broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the search.”88  
Rather, the Court held that the lawful arrest based on probable cause is 
itself sufficient to establish the authority to search, and therefore “a search 
incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.”89 
Justice Marshall dissented, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan.90  
The dissenters criticized the majority for departing from the Court’s “long 
tradition of case-by-case adjudication of the reasonableness of searches and 
seizures under the Fourth Amendment.”91  They noted that “[t]he 
constitutional validity of a warrantless search is preeminently the sort of 
question which can only be decided in the concrete factual context of the 
individual case” and contended that this  “intensive, at times painstaking” 
inquiry reflects the Court’s “jealous regard for maintaining the integrity of 
individual rights.”92 
Several prominent commentators have suggested, however, that the 
majority’s decision to forego a case-by-case inquiry has merit.93  A search 
incident to arrest is the most common type of law enforcement search and 
occurs in an extremely wide variety of circumstances, which would 
arguably make difficult a detailed factual inquiry into the potential for 
discovering evidence or weapons in each case.94  An arrest is also a serious 
and lengthy event that leaves the officer vulnerable to attack, so items that 
may not generally be dangerous could be used against the officer during an 
arrest.95  Moreover, the decision to search must be made with less 
forethought than most other searches, because arrests are frequently 
unanticipated, and a search incident to arrest must be executed quickly if it 
is to successfully prevent the destruction of evidence and preserve officer 
safety.96  Thus, one prominent commentator argues, 
 
 86. Id. at 235. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 238 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 239. 
 92. Id. at 238 (citations omitted). 
 93. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 5.2(c), at 141; WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 3.5(b), at 206 (5th ed. 2009). 
 94. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 93, § 3.5(b), at 206. 
 95. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 254 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 96. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 93, § 3.5(b), at 206. 
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A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands and 
buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, 
may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and 
judges eagerly feed, but they may be “literally impossible of application 
by the officer in the field.”97 
Moreover, this type of detailed analysis is arguably unnecessary because the 
fact of an arrest based on probable cause is by itself sufficient to justify the 
search, which is theoretically a less significant deprivation of liberty than 
the arrest itself.98 
Whether well reasoned or not, Robinson has had a substantial impact on 
the scope of the search incident to arrest exception.99  Under Robinson, 
courts have allowed searches of many different types of “containers” found 
on an arrestee’s person, including those containing written information, 
such as wallets100 and address books,101 without assessing the likelihood the 
searched container could contain evidence or weapons.102 
 
 97. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 5.2(c), at 140 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 
471 F.2d 1082, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), rev’d, 414 U.S. 218).  
Professor LaFave argues that the Fourth Amendment can only truly protect individual 
liberties if police are acting under rules that they can consistently apply correctly; otherwise, 
motions to suppress evidence may be granted, but the underlying intrusions will not abate. 
See id. § 5.2(c), at 140–41. 
 98. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 93, § 3.5(b), at 206. 
 99. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 5.2(c), at 144–45. 
 100. See United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341, 1346 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514, 1527 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. McEachern, 675 F.2d 
618, 622 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Gay, 623 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Castro, 596 F.2d 674, 
677 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 101. See United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 777 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Holzman, 871 F.2d 1496, 1504 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Napolitano, 552 F. Supp. 
465, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 102. However, at least one state has statutorily narrowed Robinson’s holding, and a 
handful of state courts have interpreted their state constitutions to bar Robinson’s 
generalization. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276, § 1 (LexisNexis 2002) (“A search conducted 
incident to an arrest may be made only for the purposes of seizing fruits, instrumentalities, 
contraband and other evidence of the crime for which the arrest has been made . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); Commonwealth v. Pierre, 893 N.E.2d 378, 381 n.4 (Mass. 2008) 
(recognizing that the statute was enacted in response to Robinson); see also Jackson v. State, 
791 P.2d 1023, 1028 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) (concluding on state constitutional grounds that 
during a search incident to an arrest for which no evidence could exist on the person, a 
search of “smaller containers which could only contain atypical weapons such as a razor 
blade, a small knife, a safety pin, or a needle must be supported by specific and articulable 
facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe that such an atypical weapon was in 
the small container”); State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 59 (Haw. 1974) (holding that a search 
incident to arrest must be examined on a case-by-case basis and “limited in scope to a 
situation where it is reasonably necessary to discover the fruits or instrumentalities of the 
crime for which the defendant is arrested, or to protect the officer from attack, or to prevent 
the offender from escaping”); State v. Neil, 958 A.2d 1173, 1178 (Vt. 2008) (holding that a 
search of a closed container on an arrestee’s person is not lawful under the state constitution 
unless justified by exigencies tied to the particular case). 
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2.  The Court Establishes a Somewhat More Searching Inquiry  
into Whether an Arrestee Could Reasonably Have  
Accessed the Searched Area 
The lawfulness of a search conducted well after an arrest depends largely 
on the nature of the item searched.103  A search of an arrestee’s person—
including effects “immediately associated” with the arrestee’s person—may 
be lawfully conducted after the accused arrives at the place of detention, 
assuming that the search would have been lawful if conducted at the time of 
arrest.104  However, a search of items not “immediately associated” with the 
arrestee’s person may not be conducted after law enforcement officers have 
reduced the items to their “exclusive control.”105 
The Court explained the reasoning for this dichotomy in United States v. 
Chadwick.106  The Court concluded that, once police have brought an 
arrestee’s items within their exclusive control, there is no longer a danger 
that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or 
destroy evidence.107  In a search of the arrestee’s person, the Court noted 
that the search is nonetheless justified by the reduced expectation of privacy 
an arrestee has in his person following an arrest.108  However, a search of 
items not on the arrestee’s person or immediately associated with his person 
at the time of arrest cannot be later justified by the reduced expectation of 
privacy the arrestee has in his person following an arrest.109 
A search incident to arrest may also be unlawful if the arrestee could not 
have accessed the searched area to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence.110  
Chimel established that a search incident to arrest may only extend to the 
area within which an arrestee might be able to grab a weapon or destructible 
evidence.111  However, following Chimel, it was not clear how closely a 
court must examine the facts of a particular case to determine whether the 
arrestee could have accessed the searched area.112   
The Court has elaborated on this issue in a series of cases involving 
automobile searches.  In New York v. Belton,113 an officer arrested four 
occupants of a vehicle for drug offenses.114  After the arrestees exited the 
car, the officer searched the passenger compartment and discovered cocaine 
 
 103. Compare United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1977) (holding that a 
delayed search of a footlocker seized from an arrestee’s trunk was unlawful), with United 
States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 801–02, 808–09 (1974) (upholding a delayed search of an 
arrestee’s clothing). 
 104. See Edwards, 415 U.S. at 803. 
 105. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15. 
 106. 433 U.S. 1. 
 107. Id. at 15. 
 108. Id. at 16 n.10 (citing Edwards, 415 U.S. 800; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 
218 (1973)). 
 109. See id. 
 110. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981). 
 111. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760 (1969). 
 112. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 457–58. 
 113. Id. at 454. 
 114. Id. at 456. 
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in the pocket of a jacket in the car.115  The Court upheld the search, holding 
that a vehicular search incident to arrest may extend to the full passenger 
compartment of a vehicle and any containers found therein.116 
The Court reasoned that officers needed a clear standard to apply in the 
volatile setting of a vehicle arrest in order to carry out their duties 
efficiently, safely, and effectively.117  Therefore, the Court embraced what 
it called a “generalization” that items within the passenger compartment of 
an automobile are within an arrestee’s reaching distance and therefore 
within his immediate control.118 
The Court reexamined Belton in Thornton v. United States.119 In 
Thornton, an officer arrested the defendant for a drug offense as the 
defendant was exiting his vehicle.120  The officer placed the defendant 
under arrest, handcuffed him, put him in the back seat of the police car, and 
returned to the vehicle to search it, discovering a handgun under the driver’s 
seat.121  The Court held that Belton authorized the search.122 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment but 
argued that the search could not be justified by the Chimel rationales.123  
Justice Scalia reasoned that because the arrestee was secured and not within 
reaching distance of the vehicle at the time of the search, “[t]he risk that he 
would nevertheless grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m] from his car was 
remote in the extreme.”124 
However, Justice Scalia provided an alternative justification for the 
search.125  He suggested that a Belton search could be justified “simply 
because the car might contain evidence relevant to the crime for which [the 
defendant] was arrested.”126  He discussed how the Court had relied on this 
justification before Chimel and argued that those cases expressed a 
reasonable interpretation of what the Fourth Amendment requires.127  
Therefore, Justice Scalia proposed limiting Belton searches to instances 
where it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest 
might be found in the vehicle.”128 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 460. 
 117. Id. at 458. 
 118. Id. at 460. 
 119. 541 U.S. 615 (2004). 
 120. Id. at 618. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 618–19. 
 123. See id. at 629 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 124. Id. at 625 (second alteration in original) (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
763 (1969)). 
 125. Id. at 629. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 629, 631 (citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950), 
overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752; Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151–52  (1947), 
overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752; Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927); 
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 
(1914)). 
 128. Id. at 632. 
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In Arizona v. Gant,129 the Supreme Court again examined the 
justifications for a Belton search.130  In Gant, the defendant was arrested for 
driving on a suspended license.131  The officers handcuffed the defendant 
and locked him in their patrol car.132  They then returned to the defendant’s 
car, searched it, and found cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the 
backseat.133 
The Court held that the search was unlawful.134  The Court established 
that a Belton search is only permitted if one of two conditions is satisfied.  
First, the vehicle may be searched if the arrestee is within reaching distance 
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.135  Second, due to 
“circumstances unique to the vehicle context,” the vehicle may be searched 
“when it is ‘reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of 
arrest might be found in the vehicle.’”136  The Court acknowledged that this 
rule did not follow from Chimel and was based only on the possibility of 
discovering evidence of the crime of arrest.137 
The “reasonable to believe” standard from Gant is not a completely clear 
line.138  In other search contexts, the phrase “reasonable to believe” is often 
interpreted as requiring “probable cause.”139  At least one court has 
attributed this meaning to Gant’s “reasonable to believe” language.140  
However, the Gant Court could not have intended this meaning “because 
otherwise Gant’s evidentiary rationale would merely duplicate the 
‘automobile exception,’ which the Court specifically identified as a distinct 
exception to the warrant requirement.”141  Most courts have therefore 
interpreted the Gant standard as requiring only reasonable suspicion, a 
lesser degree of suspicion than probable cause.142 
Gant’s authority outside the context of a vehicle search is also somewhat 
unclear.  Some courts have applied Gant’s grab-area limitation to searches 
of nonvehicles.143  However, one prominent commentator has suggested 
 
 129. 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
 130. Id. at 335. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 351. 
 136. Id. at 343 (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
concurring)). 
 137. Id. 
 138. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 7.1(d), at 711 (noting that Gant “contains a variety of 
language suggesting an array of possibilities” regarding the level of suspicion necessary to 
conduct a search for evidence). 
 139. Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 490 (6th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1111–12 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 140. United States v. Grote, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1203 (E.D. Wash. 2009). 
 141. United States v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 142. See, e.g., id.; People v. McCarty, 229 P.3d 1041, 1046 (Colo. 2010); United States v. 
Taylor, 49 A.3d 818, 823 (D.C. 2012). 
 143. See, e.g., United States v. Shakir, 616 F.3d 315, 318 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]here is no 
plausible reason why [Gant should apply] only with respect to automobile searches, rather 
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that the Court’s explicit limitation of Gant’s second prong to 
“circumstances unique to the vehicle context” suggests that it “appear[s] to 
have no application whatsoever” to searches outside the vehicle context.144 
 
II.  APPLYING THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION  
TO CELL PHONE SEARCHES 
Part I examined the evolution of the search incident to arrest exception in 
the Supreme Court.  This Part analyzes three approaches that have been 
taken to applying that doctrine to cell phone searches:  a broad approach, a 
middle approach, and a narrow approach. 
A.  The Broad Approach:  Searching Cell Phone Data  
Is Permitted Under the Exception 
This section explores a broad approach that holds that police may 
lawfully search cell phone data incident to an arrest without any cell phone–
specific limitations. 
1.  People v. Diaz 
In People v. Diaz,145 the California Supreme Court held that police may 
lawfully search the text message folder of a cell phone seized from an 
arrestee’s person incident to an arrest.146  Police arrested the defendant for 
drug-related offenses.147  After transferring the defendant to a police 
station, the officers searched the phone and found a message connecting the 
defendant to drug trafficking.148 
The defendant argued that cell phones should be subject to special search 
incident to arrest rules because they “contain [] quantities of personal data 
unrivaled by any conventional item of evidence . . . such as an article of 
clothing, a wallet, or a crumpled cigarette box found in an arrestee’s 
pocket.”149  However, the court rejected this argument.  The court reasoned 
that nothing in the Supreme Court’s decisions suggested that authority to 
search an item “seized from an arrestee’s person incident to a lawful 
custodial arrest depends on the item’s character, including its capacity for 
storing personal information.”150  Rather, the court held that Robinson 
authorized a full search of the arrestee’s person without any additional 
justification.151  In the court’s view, this was confirmed by Belton, which 
 
than in any situation where the item searched is removed from the suspect’s control between 
the time of the arrest and the time of the search.”). 
 144. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 5.5(a), at 296. 
 145. 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011). 
 146. Id. at 502. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 502–03. 
 149. Id. at 506 (first alteration in original). 
 150. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 151. Id. 
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held there was no need to distinguish between containers found during a 
vehicle search, because “the justification for the search is not that the 
arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial 
arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may 
have.”152 
The court also noted that the defendant’s approach “would create difficult 
line-drawing problems.”153  The court reasoned that it would be hard to 
draw a distinction between cell phones and other objects that might contain 
“highly personal, intimate and private information, such as photographs, 
letters, or diaries.”154  And, even if some cell phones could be distinguished 
based on their storage capacity, the court failed to see why this would 
justify exempting all cell phones.155  The court noted that distinguishing 
some phones from others based on their storage capacity would be 
impractical because officers would not be able to determine a particular 
phone’s capacity during an arrest.156  Lastly, the court added that if “the 
wisdom of the high court’s decisions must be newly evaluated in light of 
modern technology, then that reevaluation must be undertaken by the high 
court itself.”157 
2.  People v. Riley 
Finding Diaz controlling, the California Court of Appeals upheld a search 
of an arrestee’s smartphone following an arrest on gun charges in People v. 
Riley.158  The search extended to photographs, videos, and a contact list 
stored on the defendant’s phone.159  The defendant petitioned for certiorari, 
which the U.S. Supreme Court granted in January 2014 to review the 
lawfulness of the search.160 
 
 
 152. Id. at 507 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–
61 (1981)).  In a footnote, the Diaz court recognized that Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 
(2009), limited Belton, but the court nonetheless held that Gant “reaffirmed Belton’s holding 
that whether a particular container may be searched does not depend on its character or the 
extent of the arrestee’s expectation of privacy in it.” Diaz, 244 P.3d at 507 n.9 (citing Gant, 
556 U.S. at 345). 
 153. Id. at 508. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 511 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 158. No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), cert. granted, 
134 S.Ct. 999 (2014). 
 159. Id. at *3. 
 160. Riley, 134 S.Ct. 999.  The question presented for review is “[w]hether evidence 
admitted at petitioner’s trial was obtained in a search of petitioner’s cell phone that violated 
petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Id. 
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3.  United States v. Finley 
In United States v. Finley,161 the Fifth Circuit upheld a search of cell 
phone data, including text messages and call records, under facts similar to 
those in Diaz.162  Police arrested the defendant for a narcotics offense and 
seized a  cell phone from his person.163  The officers transferred the 
defendant to another location and then searched the phone.164 
The court reasoned that, under Robinson, police could search the phone 
for evidence in order to preserve it for later use at trial.165  The court also 
relied on a Seventh Circuit case that held a search of a pager was lawful 
under Robinson.166 
4.  United States v. Murphy 
The Fourth Circuit reached a similar holding in United States v. 
Murphy.167  In Murphy, the defendant was arrested for obstruction of justice 
for providing a false identity during a vehicle stop.168  A cell phone was 
subsequently discovered on the defendant’s person and searched.169 
The court held that the search was lawful, referencing the “‘manifest 
need . . . to preserve evidence’” recognized in its prior electronic search 
cases.170  The defendant conceded that a phone with a small storage 
capacity could be searched without a warrant because its data was 
“volatile.”171  However, he argued that a cell phone with a larger storage 
capacity could not be searched without a warrant because its content would 
implicate a heightened privacy interest.172 
The court rejected this argument, finding no meaningful way to quantify 
a “large” storage capacity as opposed to a “small” storage capacity.173  The 
court also noted there was no reason to assume that information would be 
more “volatile” when stored on a phone with a smaller storage capacity.174  
Lastly, forcing police officers to determine a phone’s storage capacity 
before searching it “would simply be an unworkable and unreasonable 
rule.”175 
 
 161. 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 162. Id. at 253–54. 
 163. Id. at 254. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 259–60. 
 166. Id. at 260 (citing United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 167. 552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 168. Id. at 407–08. 
 169. Id. at 409. 
 170. Id. at 411–12 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Young, 278 F. App’x 
242, 245-46 (4th Cir. 2008)). 
 171. Id. at 411. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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5.  United States v. Flores-Lopez 
In United States v. Flores-Lopez,176 police arrested the defendant for 
drug-related offenses.177  At the scene of the arrest, officers searched the 
defendant and seized a cell phone from his person.  They then searched the 
phone to determine its number.178  The Seventh Circuit held that the search 
was lawful but reserved the possibility that a more intrusive cell phone 
search might not be permissible.179 
Judge Posner examined the potential justifications for a search of cell 
phone data incident to an arrest.180  He concluded that a cell phone poses no 
danger once securely in the possession of an arresting officer, so an 
electronic search of cell phone data could not be justified by police officers’ 
reasonable concerns for their safety.181  However, he determined that a cell 
phone search could conceivably be justified by the government’s interest in 
preserving evidence.182  It is possible for a user who does not have physical 
access to a phone to remotely delete its data.183  Judge Posner reasoned that 
this “remote-wiping” technology could theoretically be used by an 
arrestee’s accomplice to destroy incriminating evidence.184  The wiped data 
could be recoverable in a laboratory, but this process would create a 
delay.185 
Ultimately, Judge Posner concluded that balancing the justifications for a 
search against its invasion of privacy interests is not necessary under 
Robinson.186  Rather, a search incident to arrest is automatically permitted 
as long as it is no more invasive than, “say, a frisk, or the search of a 
conventional container.”187  Because a search to determine a cell phone’s 
number does not exceed this level of invasiveness, the court concluded that 
such a search is lawful.188  Judge Posner added that he could imagine 
justifications for a more extensive search but left that question “for another 
day.”189 
 
 176. 670 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 177. Id. at 804. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 810. 
 180. Id. at 806–09. 
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 182. Id. at 807–08. 
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 186. Id. at 809–10. 
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B.  The Middle Approach:  Searching Cell Phone Data Is Lawful Under the 
Exception Only If It Is Reasonable To Believe That Evidence Relevant to the 
Crime of Arrest Might Be Found on the Phone 
This section examines a middle approach that permits a warrantless 
search of cell phone data incident to arrest only when it is reasonable to 
believe evidence related to the crime of arrest might be found on the phone. 
1.  United States v. Quintana 
In United States v. Quintana,190 the court held that a cell phone search 
incident to defendant’s arrest for driving on a suspended license was 
unlawful.191  The court distinguished Finley, noting that in that case, “there 
was a reasonable probability that information stored on [the defendant’s] 
device was evidence of [his] crime.”192  This was true because the 
defendant in Finley was arrested for drug-related activity, which is 
associated with cell phone use.193  In contrast, the court noted that there was 
no reason to believe evidence relevant to the defendant’s arrest for driving 
on a suspended license would be found on his cell phone.194  Rather, the 
court concluded that the officer was merely rummaging for evidence of an 
unrelated offense.195 
The court noted that, under Robinson, authority to search an arrestee’s 
person incident to an arrest does not turn on the probability that weapons or 
evidence will be discovered.196  However, the court nonetheless relied on 
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton and comments during oral 
argument in Gant (which was still undecided at that time) for the idea that a 
search based on only an evidence-gathering rationale must be linked to 
some probability of discovering evidence related to the arrestee’s initial 
offense.197  The Court held that because the search could not have 
uncovered evidence related to the defendant’s arrest for driving on a 
suspended license, the search “pushe[d] the search-incident-to-arrest 
doctrine beyond its limits.”198 
2.  United States v. McGhee 
In United States v. McGhee,199 the court reached a similar conclusion.200  
In that case, the defendant was arrested for narcotics offenses that he 
allegedly committed ten months earlier.201  A cell phone was taken from his 
 
 190. 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 
 191. Id. at 1301. 
 192. Id. at 1299. 
 193. See id. 
 194. Id. at 1300. 
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 197. Id. at 1300–01. 
 198. Id. at 1300. 
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 201. Id. at *3. 
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person and searched.202  The court held that the search was unlawful 
because it was not reasonable for the arresting officers to believe that the 
cell phone still contained evidence relevant to the offenses.203 
*  *  * 
To date, the evidence-based approach has been employed only by two 
trial courts.204  However, several commentators have argued that the 
approach should be widely adopted.205 
First, these commentators contend that Robinson should not apply to cell 
phone searches.  Professor Kerr argues that Robinson made sense in its day 
only because the search that the Court envisioned was necessarily narrow in 
scope.206  At that time, a search of an individual’s person might uncover 
“keys, a wallet, cigarettes, or a small amount of narcotics.”207  In contrast, 
searches of cell phones can uncover “the equivalent of many millions of 
pages of text.”208  Additionally, Professor Kerr argues that the Chimel 
rationales do not justify routine searches of cell phones.209  “No one thinks 
that an electronic search through a cell phone might reveal a dangerous 
weapon,” and in most cases the search also will not preserve evidence 
related to the crime of arrest.210 
As a solution, Professor Kerr argues that cell phone searches should be 
permitted “only when justified by the evidence-preserving rationale 
justifying the exception.”211  He points to Gant as doctrinal support for this 
approach.212  As discussed above, Gant established that a vehicle search 
incident to arrest is lawful if either of two conditions are met:  first, if the 
arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle at the time of the search; 
and second, if it is reasonable to believe that evidence related to the crime 
of arrest might be found in the vehicle.213 
Professor Kerr suggests that the first prong of Gant may be unnecessary 
for cell phone searches because a cell phone can easily be removed from an 
arrestee’s reach.214  However, he argues that the second prong should be 
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applied to cell phone searches.215  Under this approach, a cell phone could 
be lawfully searched pursuant to the exception “only when ‘it is reasonable 
to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found’ in the 
device.”216 
Commentators have suggested that this rule would substantially reduce 
the number of cell phone searches conducted incident to arrest because, for 
many crimes, any potential evidence in the arrestee’s cell phone will not be 
related to the reason for his arrest.217  Professor Gershowitz argues that this 
would be the case for “traffic offenses, murder, rape, and robbery.”218  
Similarly, Professor Kerr notes that an individual arrested for drunk driving 
would probably not have evidence related to his offense on his cell 
phone.219  On the other hand, he suggests that “[a] person charged with 
making a threat by telephone might have records of the threat on his 
phone.”220 
However, even a proponent of this approach acknowledges it “will not 
provide a quick and easy solution.”221  Indeed, it is far from clear whether a 
cell phone search would be automatically justified following, for example, a 
drug arrest.222  In dictum, the Quintana court stated that such a search 
would be lawful.223  Professor Gershowitz has agreed, reasoning that cell 
phones are recognized tools of the drug trade.224  However, Professor Kerr 
has stated that a person arrested for possessing marijuana probably would 
not have evidence related to the offense stored on his phone.225 
Under the evidence-based approach, the permissible scope of the search 
is also unclear.226  Professor Gershowitz notes that even permissible 
searches would be limited in scope under this rule.227  For example, he 
contends that it would make sense to search a phone’s text messages for 
evidence of a drug-related crime, because that function is commonly used in 
conjunction with drug sales.228  However, photos and internet browsing 
history would be off-limits, he argues, because that information would 
likely have nothing to do with drug sales.229 
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C.  The Narrow Approach:  Searching Cell Phone Data 
Is Not Permitted Under the Exception 
This section focuses on a narrow approach that prohibits searches of cell 
phone data under the exception. 
1.  State v. Smith 
In State v. Smith,230 the Ohio Supreme Court held that police may not 
search the contents of a cell phone pursuant to the search incident to arrest 
exception.231  In Smith, police arrested the defendant in his home for 
narcotics distribution, searched him, and found a cell phone on his 
person.232  After transporting the defendant to the police station, an officer 
searched the contents of the phone, including its call history.233 
The court held that the search was unlawful.234  The court reasoned that a 
cell phone is not analogous to a container; rather, objects falling under the 
definition of a “closed container” had traditionally been “physical objects 
capable of holding other physical objects.”235  The court noted that this 
limitation was supported by the Supreme Court’s definition of a “container” 
as “any object capable of holding another object.”236 
The court recognized that other courts had previously upheld searches of 
pagers and electronic memo books under the exception, but the court noted 
that these courts failed to consider the Supreme Court’s container 
definition.237  Moreover, the court distinguished these searches from 
searches of cell phone data.238  The court reasoned that even the least 
advanced cell phones today are capable of holding far more information 
than a pager or electronic organizer.239  The court determined that this 
capability gives the users of cell phones “a reasonable and justifiable 
expectation of a higher level of privacy in the information they contain.”240 
The court also noted that once a cell phone is in police custody, “the state 
has satisfied its immediate interest in collecting and preserving evidence 
and can take preventative steps to ensure that the data found on the phone 
are neither lost nor erased.”241  Balancing the state’s limited interest against 
the arrestee’s heightened privacy interest, the court concluded that after 
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seizing a cell phone incident to an arrest, “police must then obtain a warrant 
before intruding into the phone’s contents.”242  
2.  Smallwood v. State 
The Supreme Court of Florida reached a similar holding in Smallwood v. 
State.243  In that case, the arresting officer seized a cell phone from the 
defendant’s person during a search incident to an arrest for robbery.244  The 
officer searched for data on the phone and discovered five digital images 
relevant to the suspected robbery.245 
The court held that the warrantless search of the defendant’s cell phone 
was unlawful, reasoning that Robinson did not control its decision because 
“that case clearly did not involve the search of a modern electronic device 
and the extensive information and data held in a cell phone.”246  Following 
Robinson would require analogizing a crumpled package of cigarettes to a 
modern cell phone, which, the court held, would be “like comparing a one-
cell organism to a human being.”247  The court discussed the “[v]ast 
amounts of private, personal information” stored in cell phones, “including 
not just phone numbers and call history, but also photos, videos, bank 
records, medical information, daily planners, and even correspondence 
between individuals through applications such as Facebook and Twitter.”248  
In contrast, Robinson involved a “static, non-interactive container.”249  
Therefore, the court distinguished, in terms of both quantity and quality, the 
type of information stored on a cell phone compared with that contained in 
other items found on an arrestee’s person.250 
The court also concluded that after the phone was removed from the 
defendant’s person, “there was no possibility that [the defendant] could use 
the device as a weapon, nor could he have destroyed any evidence that may 
have existed on the phone.”251  Therefore, neither an officer-safety nor 
preservation-of-evidence rationale could justify the search, which therefore 
required a warrant.252 
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3.  United States v. Wurie 
In United States v. Wurie,253 the First Circuit became the first federal 
circuit court to hold a cell phone search incident to arrest unlawful.254  
Officers arrested the defendant for distributing crack cocaine and took him 
to the police station, where they seized a cell phone from his person.255  
Several minutes later, officers at the station noticed the phone repeatedly 
ringing and observed that the incoming calls were identified as coming 
from “my house” on the external identification screen on the front of the 
phone.256  They opened the phone to examine its call log and hit two 
buttons to identify the number associated with “my house.”257 
The government argued that Robinson authorized a full search of the 
phone without any justification other than a lawful arrest.258  However, the 
court rejected this as an overly formalistic view of Robinson.259  The court 
conceded that “Robinson speaks broadly” and that the Supreme Court has 
never limited a search incident to arrest based on the type of item 
searched.260  However, the court distinguished a cell phone search from 
other searches incident to an arrest because of the substantial volume and 
breadth of highly personal information stored on a cell phone.261  Allowing 
a warrantless search of this “virtual warehouse” of private information 
would harken back to the general searches of the colonial era, which had 
inspired the Framers to adopt the Fourth Amendment.262  Moreover, the 
Robinson Court could not have imagined that this level of intrusiveness 
would spring from its decision, because the Court “could not have 
envisioned a world in which the vast majority of arrestees would be 
carrying on their person an item containing not physical evidence but a vast 
store of intangible data.”263 
The court also held that cell phone searches as a category can never be 
justified by the Chimel rationales.264  The court concluded that a cell 
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phone’s data does not pose a threat to officer safety.265  Moreover, a cell 
phone search cannot be justified by a need to preserve evidence, because 
police officers have at least three options available to prevent data in a 
seized phone from being lost or destroyed.266  First, they can turn the phone 
off or take out its battery.267  Second, they can place the phone in an 
inexpensive device that prevents data from being remotely deleted.268  
Third, they can copy the phone’s contents to another device.269 
Additionally, the court held that a bright-line rule was necessary for cell 
phone searches.270 
A series of opinions allowing some cell phone data searches but not 
others, based on the nature and reasonableness of the intrusion, would 
create exactly the “inherently subjective and highly fact specific” set of 
rules that the Court has warned against and would be extremely difficult 
for officers in the field to apply.271 
Therefore, even though the search of the defendant’s cell phone was limited 
to his call log, the court found it necessary for all cell phone data searches 
to be governed by the same rule in order to protect against more invasive 
searches of text messages, emails, or photographs.272  The court thus held 
that “the search-incident-to-arrest exception does not authorize the 
warrantless search of data on a cell phone seized from an arrestee’s 
person.”273 
III.  PLACING LIMITS ON SEARCHING CELL PHONE DATA  
INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST 
The previous Part identified three approaches to applying the search 
incident to arrest exception to searches of cell phone data.  This Part argues 
that courts should adopt the narrow approach and prohibit warrantless 
searches of cell phone data under the search incident to arrest exception.  
Part III.A explains that the broad approach is not required by Robinson and 
is not justified by a need to protect police officers or preserve evidence.  
Part III.B suggests that the middle approach would likely prove unworkable 
and would permit searches that are unreasonable because they are not 
necessary to preserve evidence related to an arrestee’s crime.  Part III.C 
argues that the narrow approach is the only solution that provides a 
workable framework for law enforcement and protects an individual’s 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. 
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A.  The Broad Approach Is Not Required by Robinson and  
Is Not Justified by the Chimel Rationales 
The broad approach does not follow from the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Robinson, because a modern cell phone shares few of the characteristics of 
a physical container.274  A typical cell phone today stores far more 
information than an individual could carry on his person in a physical 
container.275  Additionally, unlike physical containers, which will only 
occasionally contain personal information, a cell phone is very likely to 
contain some of a person’s most private information, “including not just 
phone numbers and call history, but also photos, videos, bank records, 
medical information, daily planners, and even correspondence between 
individuals through applications such as Facebook and Twitter.”276  Nearly 
forty years ago, the Robinson Court could not have envisioned that at least 
half of Americans would be regularly carrying a device capable of storing 
such a vast quantity of personal information.277  Therefore, Robinson does 
not require permitting the search of a cell phone found on an arrestee’s 
person incident to an arrest. 
Additionally, the broad approach is not justified by the Chimel rationales.  
A cell phone does not pose a danger to police officers once removed from a 
defendant’s possession.278 Unlike pagers and early cell phones, even the 
most basic modern cell phones have significant storage capacities, which 
substantially reduces the chance that data will be automatically deleted from 
them.279  It is also very unlikely that a phone’s contents could be remotely 
destroyed.  An arrestee would be unable to remotely delete data while 
detained, and presumably during that time, an arrestee’s communication 
with outsiders would be monitored for illegal activity, including conspiring 
to destroy evidence.  Even in the unlikely event that “remote wiping” 
proved to be a legitimate problem, police departments could prevent data 
from being destroyed by turning the phone off or placing it in an 
inexpensive device that prevents the phone from receiving an outside 
signal.280  In short, unless the loss or destruction of data through remote 
wiping proves to be a problem, this concern does not warrant allowing 
police to search thousands or potentially millions of devices that store some 
of the public’s most personal information. 
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B.  The Middle Approach Is Self-Contradictory, Overstates the Evidence-
Preservation Rationale, and Would Likely Prove Unworkable 
The middle approach is self-contradictory.  On the one hand, advocates 
of the approach correctly point out that the incredible volume and breadth 
of personal information stored on a cell phone supports deviating from the 
Robinson rule.281  However, on the other hand, they claim that in most 
arrest situations, it would be unreasonable to believe that evidence related to 
an arrestee’s crime might be found somewhere in this vast store of data.282 
In fact, in most arrest situations, it would likely be reasonable for an 
officer to believe that evidence related to an arrestee’s crime might be found 
on his cell phone.  Text messages are commonly offered as evidence in 
cases of murder,283 robbery,284 and rape.285  When a defendant is arrested 
for a violent crime, it is also not uncommon for police to find incriminating 
photographs on the arrestee’s phone.286  Similarly, in a drug arrest, it would 
likely be reasonable to believe that an arrestee’s contact list might contain 
evidence of drug associations.287  A variety of other incriminating data, 
including emails and social media content could arguably be found on an 
arrestee’s cell phone in other types of arrests.  For example, someone 
arrested for driving on a suspended license might have a notice of the 
suspension in his email messages.288  Even an individual arrested for 
driving under the influence might have recently used a social media 
application to post that he was at a bar.289 
As cell phones continue to become more integrated into our lives, it will 
only become more reasonable to believe that evidence related to an 
arrestee’s offense might be found in his cell phone.  The storage capacity 
and number of applications on a typical cell phone has increased 
dramatically in recent years, and, as this continues, users will likely store 
more personal information on their phones.290 
However, the mere possibility of discovering evidence related to an 
arrestee’s offense is not sufficient to support a search under the Fourth 
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Amendment.291  Rather, the search incident to arrest exception is justified 
only by the two rationales articulated in Chimel.292  As discussed in Part 
III.A, cell phone searches cannot be justified by these rationales, because 
cell phones do not pose a danger to police officers and the possibility of a 
cell phone’s data being lost or destroyed after it is seized by police is 
extremely remote. 
Some commentators have suggested that the middle approach could be 
justified as an adaptation or extension of Gant.293  However, courts and 
commentators should be careful to not overstate the significance of Gant on 
cell phone searches.  Gant is fundamentally about the proper scope of an 
arrestee’s grab area in the context of a vehicle search.294  This is not an 
issue when a cell phone is found on an arrestee’s person.  Moreover, the 
Gant Court explicitly limited its holding to vehicle searches.295  Unlike a 
vehicle, which the Court has held is associated with a reduced expectation 
of privacy, a cell phone implicates a heightened expectation of privacy due 
to the volume of highly personal information it is capable of storing.296  
Therefore, even if Gant does have some precedential value outside the 
vehicle context, it would be unreasonable to extend Gant to justify cell 
phone searches. 
Additionally, the middle approach would be difficult for police to apply 
and courts to evaluate, likely leading to inconsistent results.  Courts have 
not clearly defined whether the reason-to-believe standard is equivalent to 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion.297  Moreover, even in one of the 
most common arrest situationsa drug arrestscholars do not agree that it 
would be reasonable to believe an arrestee’s cell phone might contain 
evidence related to his offense.298  An additional complication is that 
smartphone ownership is not consistent across different racial, 
socioeconomic, or age groups.299  Therefore, it may be objectively more 
likely that incriminating data would be found on a phone seized from an 
arrestee in a young, affluent community than from an individual in an older, 
less wealthy area.300 
Thus, the middle approach would encourage the type of post hoc 
decisionmaking that the Supreme Court has sought to avoid in its Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.301  Nuanced rules may appeal to judges and 
lawyers, but they pose difficulties for officers in the field.302  Subtle 
distinctions in the search incident to arrest context are particularly 
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troublesome because a search incident to arrest is the most common form of 
law enforcement search, and police already have many factors to consider 
during the dangerous and complicated situation of an arrest.303 
C.  The Narrow Approach Provides a Workable Framework and Protects 
Individuals from Unreasonable Searches of Their Cell Phone Content 
The narrow approach provides a workable framework that officers can 
easily apply in the field.304  When a cell phone is found incident to an 
arrest, police should be permitted to seize the phone but required to obtain a 
warrant before examining its contents unless another established exception 
to the warrant requirement applies.  Although the broad approach also 
provides a clear standard, only the narrow approach respects the principle 
that the search incident to arrest exception is truly an exception and can 
only be justified by significant law enforcement interests.305  When a cell 
phone is seized incident to an arrest, there is no longer an exigency 
justifying an examination of its contents.306  The government maintains a 
broader interest in gathering evidence related to the crime of arrest, but this 
interest is served through the warrant process articulated in the Fourth 
Amendment.307  Therefore, allowing a warrantless, general evidence-
gathering search of the highly personal information contained in a cell 
phone would permit an unjustified exception to the warrant requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
The cell phone search incident to arrest issue exemplifies the challenges 
of applying Fourth Amendment principles to modern technologies.  Lower 
courts have split on whether Robinson’s forty-year-old holding extends to 
searches of cell phone data.  In its upcoming decisions on this issue in 
Wurie and Riley, the Supreme Court should recognize that cell phone 
searches cannot be justified by the rationales for the search incident to arrest 
exception.  The Court should therefore affirm the First Circuit’s decision in 
Wurie and hold that when a cell phone is found on an arrestee’s person 
incident to an arrest, police are required to obtain a warrant before 
examining its contents unless another established exception to the warrant 
requirement applies. 
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